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ABSTRACT 
The expansion of education has been widely adopted as a key element in the devel-
opment strategies of low-income countries. While there is substantial evidence on the bene-
fits of greater educational attainment for subsequent labor market earnings, empirical evi-
dence on the role played by school quality is scarce. This paper combines household survey 
data with unique data on school quality, from Honduras, to study the importance of school 
quality as a detem1inant of earnings. Our objective measures of school quaiity capture 
teacher training, school infrastrncture and school crowding. The results display strong posi-
tive effects of school quality on earnings and on educational returns. These effects p~rsist 
across a variety of model specifications. 
Keywords: Earnings, Returns to Education, School Attainment, School Quality, 
JEL Codes: 131, 015 

CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION ... .. ..... .. ........................................ .. .................. ... ........................................... ..... .. 1 
2. BACKGROlJND .......... ...... ................ ............. ... ... ..... ............... .. ... .... .. .. ...... ........... .. .......... .............. 2 
2.1 The rationale for public provision .. ......... .... ........... .......................................... ..... ..... .... .... 2 
2.2 Quantity and quality of education .. ... ........ .................. , ................................ ..... ....... ........... 3 
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ... ... .................................................................. ... ..... .... .. ................ 5 
3 .1 Incorporating School Quality in a Model of Labor Earnings ................................. ..... ....... 5 
3 .2 Esti1nation Methodology ........................... .. ..... .. .. ... ....... ....................... ....... ....................... 8 
4. THEDATA ....... ..... ................. ....... .... .......... .... ... ......................... .... ........................ ..... .. .... ... ........... 9 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS ...................... ....... ..... ........... ... ........................ ... ....................... ...... .. .... 12 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ....................... ...... .. ................ .... ... ... .. ....................... ...... ..... 25 
REFERENCES ........ ..... .............. ................................... .. ... ... ........... ..... .................................. ........ .... 27 
TABLES ..... .. ... . .. ...... .. ... ................... . ...... . ... . .... . .............................. ..... . ........ 32 

I 
1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Following the example of developed countries and the advice of international devel-
opment institutions, developing countries have devoted and continue to devote substantial 
resources to their education sectors. In 1998, public spending on education accounted for 
15.8% of total government expenditures in developing countries (UNDP, 1998). Yet, sur-
prisingly, there is little consensus that this money is being spent wisely and even disagree-
ment on whether it should come from the public sector at all. 
Among other reasons, two empirically testable assertions play an important role in ar-
guments for maintaining or expanding the role of the public sector. One is that education has 
a high rate of return. Another is that, by compensating for family-background handicaps, it 
tends to equalize the distribution of earnings. There is a substantial amount of empirical con-
finnation of these assertions when it comes to educational attaimnent, but surprisingly little 
factual evidence backs them up when it comes to the quality of education. 1 
This paper makes use of a unique data set from Honduras to examine these two as-
sertions. We use traditional estimation teclrniques to examine the impact of school quality on 
earnings and educational returns. These estimates are scrutinized for several possible weak-
nesses that have been pointed out in the past. We find robust evidence that school quality has 
a positive and quantitatively important effect on labor market earnings of adults. Next, we 
attempt to shed light on the distributional question by estimating a set of quantile regressions. 
Although the main focus of our work is on the school quality-earnings link, we conclude our 
empirical analysis by examining the effects of schooL quality tlu-ough another chatrnel, that is, 
the effect of school quality on educational attainment. 
Section II places our paper in the context of other work on the economics of educa-
tion. Section III outlines an analytical framework and discusses estimation issues. Section IV 
describes the data and section V the estimation results. Concluding observations are pre-
sented in section VI. 
1 The lack of evidence on the benefits of investing in school quality is pa11icularly true for developing countries. 
A brief review of the U.S. literature on this topic is provided in the following section. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 The rationale for public provision 
The theoretical refinement of education as economic behavior dates at least back to 
Schultz (1961 ), Mincer (1974) and Becker ( 1975). They argue that schooling increases hu-
man capital and human capital increases earnings. Optimal schooling choices are modeled as 
weighing the opportunity costs of school-attendance against an increased lifetime earnings 
stream. The fact that schooling attainment is modeled as such an inherently private micro-
economic choice gives cause to question the dominant role of the public sector in providing 
it. 
However, several arguments may be advanced in favor of public intervention in edu-
cational provision. For instance, recent work in the theory of economic growth (Romer, 
1986; Lucas, 1988; Becker et al. , 1990) provides a strong justification for public investments 
in human capital. These theories emphasize that there are externalities associated with pri-
vate investments in hw1rnn capital. That is, not only do investments in human capital en-
hance the productivity of the investing individual but through a process of interaction en-
hance the productivity of others. It is argued that in the presence of these externalities, factor 
returns may not diminish and consequently increasing investments in human capital may ac-
celerate economic growth. The presence of these externalities and their potential effects on 
grov.rth suggests that public intervention may be warranted. Empirical attempts to assess the 
externalities associated with human capital investments are reviewed by Jimenez (1995). 
Other arguments in favor of a strong public presence are linked to the fact that parents 
make decisions for their children. For instance, if parents are unable to finance education by 
borrowing against their children's future earnings, their investment may well be sub-optimal. 
A purely private educational system can not function efficiently without perfect capital mar-
kets and capital market imperfections are likely to be especially severe in developing coun-
tries. Another rationale for public intervention views education as a merit-good. It is argued 
that universal education will tend to have an equalizing effect on the distribution of income, 
perhaps even compensating for differences in family background. If parents view their chil-
dren's future welfare as a normal good, higher income parents will spend more on the educa-
tion of their offspring. Distributional impacts are thus seen as an externality of sorts. With-
out public intervention income inequality will tend to be passed on from one generation to the 
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next--or even increase. 
2.2 Quantity and quality of education 
It is well known and widely accepted that educational attainment (quantity) raises in-
come (Psacharapoulos, 1993). There is also some evidence that educational expansion 
(quantity) which is associated with an increase in the level of schooling and a reduction in 
educational disparities, tends to be associated with a more equal income distribution (dos 
Reis and de Barros, 1991 and Lam and Levinson, 1992). 
Most of the literature on the impact of quality looks at effects on intermediate out-
comes, like test-scores and grade repetition and not directly on earnings.2 But this is prob-
lematic. For one thing, it is reasonable to expect that shifts in educational standards will ac-
company variations in quality. More fundamentally though, if we consider education as in-
vestment, rather than as consumption behavior, it is clear that at best, test scores measure an 
intermediate input to earnings determination. Public investments in quality will be worth-
while only if it can be shown that they have a measurable impact on earnings. 
Several papers have examined the impact of school quality on earnings for developed 
countries (mainly the United States). These papers provide very mixed evidence. One set of 
papers rep011s strong effects of school spending on students' subsequent earnings while an-
other set finds little or no effect. 3 Based on a survey of this literature, Betts (1996a) notes 
that, in general, papers that report substantial effects measure school inputs at the stat~ level, 
are based on data from older individuals (aged thirty or older) and those who attended school 
between 1900 and 1960 (which is the case for most of the state-level studies). In contrast, 
2 
n a detailed study, Harbison and Hanushek ( 1992) survey educational production function estimates for devel-
oping and developed countries and conclude that there is no "compelling case for specific input policies" (p.25). 
Also see Hanushek (1995) and the rejoinder by Kremer {1995). Fuller and Clarke (1994) are somewhat more 
sapguine about the approach, but find that the literature suffers from the absence of a systematic, uniform and 
urliversally comparable set of quality measures. 
3 kxamples of papers that find a positive and significant school quality effect on earnings include Rizutto and 
Wachtel ( 1980) and Card and Krueger (1992a, 1992b). Papers that find insignificant school quality effects 
inlcude Ribich and Murphy (1975), Betts (1995), and Grogger (1996a, 1996b). In general Heckman· et al. 
(1995) also report insignificant effects, although the paper does report a posit ive effect of school quality on 
earnings for college graduates. 
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most of the papers that measure inputs at the school or district level, and find little effect of 
school inputs on wages, use earnings information from younger workers (i.e., those aged 
around 32 or younger) and those who attended school in the 1960s or later. Betts (l 996a) 
considers a number of hypotheses to account for the patterns found in the literature. One pos-
sible hypothesis for the strong link between school resources and earnings between 1900 and 
1960 and the absence of this relationship thereafter, may lie in diminishing returns to school 
quality. Betts (1996a) and Grogger (1996a) examine this explanation and conclude that while 
there is some supp01t for this possibility, the evidence is not compelling. An alternative in-
terpretation may lie in age-dependence. That is, the effects of school quality on earnings are 
only manifested as individuals become older and settle into their careers. Betts ( 1995; l 996b) 
does not find support for an age effect. Other possible explanations for the strong (weak) ef-
fect found in state (school)-level studies may lie in econometric explanations. For instance, if 
the data used in school-level studies is subject to measurement eITor, then the estimated coef-
ficients may be attenuated. Betts (1995) and Grogger ( l 996a) examine and reject measure-
ment error as a possible explanation. Finally, Heckman et al. (1995) point out that state-level 
studies may be afflicted by aggregation and omitted variable bias which may lead to an up-
ward bias in the estimated coefficients. Based on their work, Heckman et al. (1995) conclude 
that returns to school spending accrue only to college-educated workers. Notwithstanding the 
ongoing debate, in his review, Betts (1996a) calculates wage elasticities and internal rates of 
return (IRR) with respect to school spending and teacher-pupil ratios. These estimates sug-
gest that the IRR to additional spending per pupil and more specifically towards reducing 
class size is very low (based on the state level studies these returns are 2.55 percent and 2.35 
percent respectively). In contrast, the returns to a~ additional year spent in school or college 
are much higher.4 
4 These estimates are based on the direct impact of school quality on earnings and ignore the indirect effect that 
school quality may exert through the level of educational attainment. However, based on a detailed survey of the 
U.S. literature, Betts (1996a) reports that there is a ve1y weak link between spending per pupil (school quality) 
and educational attainment. The review shows that, similar to the school quality earnings literature, studies that 
rely on state-level data (e.g. Card and Krueger, I 992a) find a statistically significant relationship between school 
quality and educational attainment, while studies that use school level data (e.g. Ehrenberg and Brewer, 1994) do 
not report any links between spending per pupil and educational attainment. 
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While the varied findings, their underlying reasons and the lack of school quality ef-
fects on earnings and educational attainment continue to be debated in the United States, dis-
cussions in developing countries are hampered by the lack of empirical work devoted to the 
school quality-earnings link. This paucity can largely be explained by the lack of appropriate 
data. To date, only two studies have explored the link between school quality and earnings 
levels in a developing country context. Behrman and Birdsall (1983) examine the impact of 
state-level Brazilian teacher education on educational returns and earnings. They find that 
inclusion of this measure of educational quality sharply reduces the conventionally estimated 
rate of return to years of schooling. At the same time they find that an increase in school 
quality exerts a strong positive influence on the earnings level through its impact on the rate 
of return to education. Psacharopoulos and Velez (1993) use grade repetition, and test scores 
on university examinations, and university prestige ratings as indicators of school quality. 
They find that grade repetition fails to influence earnings, while university examination 
score.s and university prestige ratings have a positive impact. 
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWOIU( 
3.1 Incorporating School Quality in a Model of Labor Earnings 
Several models of earnings determination have been proposed in the literature. The 
most prominent are the Mincer-Becker (1975) human capital model and the hedonic model 
developed by Tinbergen (1951, 1956) and Rosen (1986). Suppressing the individual sub-
script i (to avoid clutter), a simple model that summarizes the earnings determination process 
can be written as, 
Y = w11He11 , (1) 
where Y is the labor market earnings of the individual, w1i, is the market rental price per unit 
of human capital, His unobservable human capital possessed by an individual, u is an error 
term representing random unobserved detenninants of earnings. 
The human capital possessed by an individual depends on the quantity and the quality 
of schooling, an individual's on-the-job training, as well as his/her family background. As 
5 
shown by Behrman and Birdsall (1983), school quality may be incorporated into the tradi-
tional Mincer framework by allowing educational returns to depend on the quality of school-
ing. In order to allow for the various other influences on human capital formation we rely on 
a widely used log-linear human capital production function, 
H=eP .. W>S TPt:H · P,,FT•·, (2) 
where Q is a vector of school quality variables, S represents years of schooling, Eis experi-
ence and Fis a vector of variables that captures the quality of the individual's home envi-
ronment. fJs, /JE and /JF are conformable coefficient vectors, to be estimated. v is an error 
term representing random influences on human capital production. Substituting (2) into (1) 
and taking logs, we get the familiar semi-log form of the earnings equation, 
lnY = lnw,,+ f3s(Q)S+ fJHE+/),,. F+v+u. (3) 
Assuming a linear approximation to the unknown function, that is, /Js (Q) = y + y1 Q, we get 
lnY =lnw,, + yS+ y1SQ+f3r:E+f3,,.F+v + u. (4) 
This specification allows school quality to influence earnings through its effect on educa-
tional returns or the slope of the earnings-schooling relationship and does not allow for a di-
rect school quality-earnings link. This implies that if the impact of quality on educational 
returns is positive then the return to educational quality will be higher at higher educational 
levels. In other words, school quality does not influence the intercept of the earnings function 
and for those with zero years of schooling there is no school quality effect. This approach is 
conceptually similar to Behrman and Birdsall (1983) and Card and Krueger (1992a) . The first 
set of estimates presented in the paper are based on specification ( 4 ).' 
Despite the link between the Mincer framework and this specification (i.e., equation 
4), most studies that have examined the effect of school quality on earnings have relied on an 
alternative specification. This alternative may be motivated by invoking the idea of "effective 
schooling", s·, which depends on the quantity (S) and quality (Q) of schooling (see Beluman 
• 
and Birdsall, 1983). In particular Smay be replaced by S , giving rise to an alternative human 
capital production function, 
Substituting 5 into 1 and taking logs, we get 
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Since the functional form of effective schooling is not known we may rely on a linear ap-
proximation to the unknown function, i.e., s' (S, Q) = 17 + 'flsS + 170 Q. Incorporating the lin-
ear approximation in (6) and rewriting, gives rise to 
lnY = lnw" + fJ + /JsS+ fJQQ+ /Jr;E+ fJFF+v1 + u . (7) 
This specification allows school quality to exert a direct impact on the level of earnings. That 
is, school quality exerts an impact on the intercept of the earnings function and does not alter 
the slope of the earnings-schooling relationship. This specification has been widely used to 
examine the school-quality earnings link. In fact, a majority of studies that have dealt with 
this issue have relied solely on a specification of this type (for recent examples see Grogger, 
1996a, 1996b ). Given the widespread use of (7), the second set of estimates presented in this 
paper relies on this specification. 
In addition, some authors (Betts, 1995) have estimated specifications that are a hybrid 
of (4) and (7). These specifications allow school quality to influence educational returns and 
to exert a direct influence on earnings. That is, school quality may influence the slope of the 
earnings-schooling relationship and the intercept of the earnings function. Allowing for both 
effects leads to, 
lnY=lnw"+ a+a,.S+aQQ+a80 SQ+fJEE+fJFF+v2 +u. (8) 
An advantage of (8) is that it nests ( 4) and (7), and statistical tests may be carried out to com-
pare the merits of the three specifications. Two further points on the links between these 
three specifications may be made. First, if school quality does exert a direct influence on 
earnings, independent of its effect through educational returns, then restricting this effect (as 
in equation 4) may lead to an underestimate of the effect of school quality on earnings. Sec-
ond, if the effect of school quality on educational returns is small (coefficient on - SQ), then 
the estimated impact of school quality on earnings based on (7) and (8) will be quite similar. 
Finally, there is no reason to suppose that the linear approximations, to f3 s (Q) and s•, 
that we rely on to specify ( 4 ), (7) and (8) are more appropriate as compared to quadratic ap-
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proximations. While we did consider the effects of school quality on earnings and educational 
returns on the basis of quadratic approximations, in order to enable comparisons with the rest 
of the literature as well as for ease of interpretation, we focus largely on models with linear 
approximations. 
3.2 Estimation Methodology 
Following a well-estabiished literatme we first estimate (4), (7) and (8) by ordinary 
least squares. Results on the basis of these three specifications are compared and analyzed. 
These OLS results are then subjected to an extended empirical scrutiny in order to verify the 
robustness of the findings. 
Next, we examine the impact of quality on the conditional earnings distribution using 
quantile regression techniques. Quantile regressions offer several advantages over OLS. 
First, the presence of heteroscedasticity can be conveniently analyzed and detected by esti-
mating regression quantiles (see Deaton 1997). Second, since estimation of the quantiles is 
based on minimizing the absolute sum of errors, rather than minimizing the sum of squares, 
they are more resistant to outliers. Finally, as emphasized by Mosteller and Tukey (1977), by 
calculating regressions for different percentiles of the distribution, the shape of the condi-
tional distribution can be thoroughly explored. 
Quantile regressions are based on estimating regression curves/lines at various per-
centiles of the distribution. Formally, rewriting (4) in a compact manner, the quantile regres-
sion model can be written as, 
Y = /J' 0 Z + u0 with Quant 0 (Y] Z) = /3 18 Z (9) 
where Z is an n x k matrix of explanatory variables, fJo, is a k x 1 vector of coefficients to be 
estimated. Quant8 (.Y]Z) denotes the ~h conditional quantile of Y given Z, and uo is a random 
error term. The quantile regression estimator of fJocan be obtained as a solution to, 
II 
min"ZfB-l(Y 5:/J'Z)](Y-f3'Z) (10) 
p ;~ J 
where 0 < () < 1 is the quantile to be estimated, and function 1 O is the usual indicator func-
tion. Computation of the regression quantiles is carried out by minimizing (I 0) using linear 
8 
programming techniques. Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are obtained by util-
izing bootstrap methods (for details see Buchinsky, 1994, 1995). 
4. THE DATA 
The data file used in this paper was created by combining info1mation from a 1986 
survey of urban Honduran households conducted by the Office of Planning, Coordination 
and Budget (SECPLAN) and data on primary school quality collected by the Ministry of 
Education for the same year. While we had access to more recent data, the 1986 data were 
purposely selected. It was in 1986 that USAID and the Honduran goverrunent launched the 
"Primary Education Efficiency Project" (PEEP), a major initiative to build schools and im-
prove the quality of education. Thus, the more recent data would have made it very difficult 
to accurately estimate the quality of schools attended by the individuals in our sample (see 
Edwards, 1995). 
The household survey is a random sample of 4,400 urban Honduran households. 
Survey information includes monthly income, demographic characteristics (such as educa-
tion, age and family size), characteristics about housing quality, and detailed information on 
population movements. Date of birth, place of birth, place of residence five years before, and 
length of residence in cunent location are all recorded. This infonnation is critical and allows 
us to identify in which of approximately 300 counties a person was educated.5 The Ministry 
of Education files are a comprehensive source of school-level data on all primary schools in 
Honduras. The files contain information on students enrolled, teacher characteristics, school 
furnishings, availability of electricity and water, and the physical characteristics of schools 
(Edwards, 1994). 
l To create the data file used here we restrict our analysis to Honduran males between th1 ages of 14 and 35, who are not cunently full time students and who supply info1mation on 
their labor income. We restrict our sample to males in order to avoid selectivity problems 
a~sociated with female labor force participation. We limit the sample to the 14-35 year age 
5 Honduras is politically sub-divided into "Departamentos" and "Municipios", which roughly correspond to U.S. 
states and counties, respectively. · 
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range, that is individuals who would have first enrolled in school between 1958 and 1979, to 
lessen the measurement error associated with the use of current school qu~li~ measures to 
explain current earnings. A total of 3,691 observations satisfy this criteria and are utilized in 
our analysis. Ministry of Education data are used to create municipal level school quality 
variables that capture teacher qualifications, school facilities, and school crowding. Informa-
tion from the household survey is used to carefully map individuals to the municipality in 
which they received their schooling. 
The descriptive statistics and definitions of the variables used in this paper are pro-
vided in table 1. The average individual in our sample has about 7 years of schooling arid 11 
years of work experience. Fifty one percent of the individuals in the sample are migrants. 
Almost 73% of the urban population lives in the central and no11hem parts of the country, 
areas which contain the capital of the counhy, Tegucigalpa, and the industrial center of the 
country, San Pedro Sula, respectively. Parental schooling averages approximately 3 years. 
The gap of almost 4 years between the parents and children displays the rapid gains in educa-
tion being experienced by Honduras in recent years. As for the school quality variables, al-
most 70% of the teachers possess teaching degrees (PRO). There are approximately 41 stu-
dents per teacher and 15 students per table. Around 41 % of the schools are classified as 
"multigrade schools," implying that there are individuals in different grades in the same class-
room. School faci lities such as electricity and water are available in around 32% and 51 % of 
all schools, respectively. Although aggregated at the municipal level, several school quality 
variables display substantial variation. For instance, provision of electricity ranges from 1.7% 
at the 10th percentile to 63.6% at the 90th percentile. Similarly, the student-teacher ratio 
I 
ranges between 31 and 48 for the 10th and 90th percentiles respectively. 
As compared to other countries, Honduran school quality is quite low. The student-
teacher ratio is nearly double that reported in other studies that have examined the effects of 
school quality. For instance, it is 26 in Ghana (Glewwe and Jacoby, 1994), 25 in Northeast 
Brazil (Harbison and Hanushek, 1992), and 21 for the United States (UNESCO, 1992). In 
terms of water and electricity, Honduran schools seem to be on par with Brazil's po01est, 
N011heastem region (35 and 43 percent respectively), but compare unfavorably to Ghana (82 
and 77 percent respectively). 
While we have comprehensive data on several measures of school quality and our 
10 
data might be some of the best developing country data with which to address the school 
quality-earnings issue it is subject to several drawbacks. First, our measures of school quality 
are municipal-level averages and therefore ignore any variation in school quality within 
schools in the same municipality. Second, for 11.5% (426 observations) of the sample we are 
unable to determine the county of school acquisition and are forced to assume that they were 
schooled in the county of their birth. 
Third, and potentiaiiy the most troublesome, OW" data on school quality are for i 986, 
while our earnings information is for people who acquired their schooling much earlier.6 If 
school quality has remained unchanged over the time period that individuals in our sample 
acquired education, or changes in school quality have been uniform acro!:s municipalities 
then the use of current school quality is not likely to create serious problems. However, if 
there have been substantial changes in the level and distribution of school quality across mu-
nicipalities then it is likely that our data are subject to measurement error. For instance, if 
school quality has increased over time then cmTent school quality will systematically over-
state the actual school quality. Accordingly, the use of such data may be expected to lead to a 
downward bias in estimates of the effect of school quality on earnings. On the other hand, if 
school quality has declined over time then current school quality will understate actual school 
quality. This in turn may impart an upward bias to estimated school quality effects. Errors due 
to the use of cunent school quality probably increase with the age of the respondent. To 
minimize this source of measurement error we restrict our sample to individuals in the 14-35 
age group. Similarly, as mentioned earlier, the use of data from 1986 is also an attempt to 
reduce this source of error. 
In addition to these precautions, to get a better idea of the likely effects of these po-
tential measurement errors we attempted to gather information on the pattern of school qual-
ity changes in Honduras. We were able to collect information (for some years we were unable 
6 This is a common problem in studies of this type. For example, in their study on Brazil, Behrman and Birdsall 
( 1983) use a school quality indicator for the situation in 1970 while their earnings data are for individuals who 
acquired schooling in previous years. Similarly, in the developed country literature, Link and Ratledge (1975) 
use data on earnings and district level school quality variables for 1968. For additional examples of studies 
which employ a similar procedure see Behrman and Birdsall (1983). 
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to collect the required data) on the number of primary school teachers and the number of pri-
mary schools in Honduras over the period 1950-1986. This infom1ation was combined with 
population data to create measures of teacher and school density (i.e., the number of primary 
school teachers and number of primary schools per 1000 population). Although these meas-
ures capture only nation-wide changes and our information is spotty it does provide an idea of 
the evolution of school quality in Honduras. Figure 1 displays that both school and teacher 
density, register substantial increases from 1950 to around 1963. Subsequently, there appears 
to be almost no change in school density. Teacher density is also fairly stable. There is a de-
crease between the mid-60s to the 80s after which _there appears to be a sl ight increase. Be-
tween 1963 and 1986, teacher density increases by around 9 percent. These patterns suggest 
that during the time period that most of the individuals in our sample acquired education 
(from the 1960s to the 1980s), changes in school quality were limited. 7 The limited changes 
in this measure of quality should not be pa11icularly surprising as during these decades there 
was very little attention paid to the education sector (see Edwards, 1995). It was only after 
the establislm1ent of a democratic regime in 1980 that there was an increase in educational 
expenditure. 
It is clear from our discussion that the data are subject to errors. While acknowledg-
ing these shortcomings, we feel that the relatively mild changes in school quality combined 
with the precautions we have taken suggests that these data may indeed be frnitfully used to 
inform the school quality debate. Later on in the text we discuss attempts to identify the ef-
fects of measurement enm on our results by instrnmenting the school qualify variables and 
carrying out specification tests. 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
A. Earnings and School Quality 
Table 2 presents estimates for a series of regression models designed to examine the 
7 Individuals in our sample started their schooling between 1958 and 1979. As Figure I shows, changes in 
school and teacher density between 1963 and 1986 are quite mild. However, changes between 1959 and 1963 
are more pronounced and it is likely that current school quality is a less accurate measure for individuals edu-
cated between these years. To control for this we restricted our sample to those who started their education after 
1963. Around 650 observations were dropped due to this exclusion. For the most part our results remained 
unchanged. 
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school quality earnings link. We begin by estimating a basic earnings equation, which is then 
augmented with several school quality variables. These school quality variables are added to 
the basic specification in accordance with the earnings models outlined earlier, i.e., equations 
(4), (7) and (8). 
The model in column I is the most parsimonious specification and includes only 
years of schooling, experience and the square of experience. The rate of return to education is 
13.8%. This estimate is at the lower end of the range that has been found for developing 
countries (Psacharopolous, 1993). Column 2 includes controls for marital and migration 
status, indicators for region of current residence and a seiection correction term for migrant 
endogeneity. Controlling for these additional variables reduces educational return estimates 
by 1.6 percentage points. Returns to marriage and migration are positive and statistically sig-
nificant (not repo1ted in table 2). As has often been pointed out in the migration literature, 
earnings functions that include a migrant dummy without correcting for selectivity are likely 
to be plagued by endogeneity bias (e.g., Tunali, 1986). This is a potentially important source 
of bias given that about half of our sample is composed of migrants. Accordingly, we control 
for the potentially endogenous nature of this variable by constructing and including paramet-
ric and non-parametric selection correction terms. The coefficient on the parametric migra-
tion selection term is negative and significant indicating the endogeneity of the migrant 
8 dummy. 
We have several school quality variables at our disposal. These variables capture dif-
ferent facets of school quality. The teaching technology is captured by the percentage of 
multigrade schools in a county (MGRADE). In a multigrade school all grades are taught si-
multaneously in one classroom, by one teacher. The pedagogical technology is different in 
such classrooms and is often thought to be inferior to single-grade techniques. Teacher qua!-
8 The selection tenns are created by estimating a first step probit model for migratory status. The non-parametric 
selection correction tenns are constructed on the basis of results in Gallant and Nychka (1987) and Pagan and 
Vella (1989). This involves using the parametric selection correction tenn powered up by the predicted values 
from the selection equation. This approach is based on the argument that departures from nonnality can be ap-
proximated by multiplying the nonnal distribution by some suitable polynomial. A simple test for nonnality is to 
test whether these selection correction tenns are jointly zero. An F-test (p-value - 0.2282) fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of normality. Details are available on request. 
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ity is picked up by variables measuring formal training (PRO), teacher education 
(T_SCHOOL) and experience on the job (T_EXPER). The physical infrastructure of the 
school and access to public services is captured by the availability of electricity 
(ELECTRICITY) and water (WATER).9 Finally classroom crowding is picked up by stu-
dent-teacher ratio (STIEACH) and classrooms per student (CLASST), and faci lity crowding 
by tables per student (TABLEST). 10 
In general, when these schooi quality variables are introduced into the regressions in-
dividually they have the expected sign and seem to be important detern1inants of earnings. 
However, due to the high correlation between some of the school quality variables, entering 
them jointly into the regression makes it difficult to identify school quality effects. In order to 
guide our selection of the appropriate school quality variables we rely on a principal compo-
nents analysis. On the basis of this analysis, four variables that represent different facets of 
school quality and capture most of the variation in school quality are selected. These are a 
measure of teacher quality (PRO), student-teacher ratio, the table-student ratio, and provision 
of electricity. Together, these four variables capture 85% of the variation in school quality. 
The remaining columns of table 2 present results that include these four school qual-
ity variables. These specifications include variables mentioned earlier. In addition, in order to 
isolate a distinct school quality effect we include controls for other municipal level variables 
that may influence earnings. In the absence of such measures it could have been argued that 
the school quality variables are picking up the effects of other municipal characteristics that 
may be co1Telated with earnings. Since there is no time variation in our data we cannot in-
clude municipal fixed effects to control for this possibility. However, to partially control for 
this effect we include five variables that control for inter-municipal variation in wealth. 11 
These variables are included in all subsequent specifications. 
9 While we do control for inter-municipality variation in access to public services, it is possible that some of the 
measures of school quality (e.g., electricity and water) do pick up the overall levels of infrastructure in the mu-
nicipalities. 
IO The last t\vo variables are defined in this way because some schools reported having no classrooms or no ta-
bles. 
11 These variables include percentage of houses in the municipality with brick walls, dirt floors, electricity, mu-
nicipal level house ownership, and percentage of legal marriages in a municipality. The inclusion of the last vari-
able as an indicator of wealth is based on the idea that in Honduras, legal marriages are more likely among so-
cially dominant groups. 
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Results based on the first specification considered by us, i.e., equation ( 4) are pre-
sented in column 3. The estimates display that except for our measure of teacher quality 
(PRO), the school quality-education interaction terms are all statistically significant at at least 
the 10 percent level. This suggests that school quality influences the slope of the earnings-
education relationship and that individuals educated in high quality municipalities have a 
higher rate of return to education as compared to those educated in municipalities with lower 
education. We find that an increase in the schooi quaiity measures by one standard deviation 
increases educational returns by 1.2 percent (bottom panel of table 2, column 3). In terms of 
earnings this implies that, an increase in the provision of electricity by one standard deviation 
is associated with an earnings increase of 3.1 percent. Similarly, a reduction in the student-
teacher ratio and an increase in the table-student ratio by one standard deviation lead to an 
increase in earnings by 4.3 and 2.7 percent respectively. All computations are at the means of 
the school quality and education variables. 
Before we proceed it should be pointed out that the results presented above are based 
on individual data that have been merged with municipal level data. As pointed out by 
Moulton (1986), in cases (as in the present context) where regressors include variables with 
repeated values within groups, ignoring intragroup error correlation may lead to incorrect sta-
tistical inference. To check for this possibility tests suggested by Breusch and Pagan (1980) 
and Moulton and Randolph (1989) were conducted. The tests were unable to reject the null 
hypothesis of no intra-group error correlation. For table 2, column 3 the test statistic dis-
played a p-value of 0.6272. Regardless of the rejection of the null, subsequent estimates are 
presented with standard errors corrected for intra-group correlation. A comparison of the es-
timates in columns 3 and 4 provides an idea of the impact of allowing for this correction. 
T~is comparison shows that, while the standard errors do increase, three of the four school 
q4ality variables remain statistically significant at at least the 10 percent level. 
We now tum to our other estimates. Estimates reported in column 5 correspond to 
I 
equation (7). This specification allows school quality to exe11 a direct and uniform (regard-
' less of the level of schooling) impact on the level of earnings. As mentioned earlier, this 
specification has been widely used to examine the effects of school quality on earnings. Es-
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timates of the rate of return to education are almost identical to those reported earlier. Simi-
larly, three of the four school quality variables are statistically significant and their magni-
tudes suggest that school quality exerts a quantitatively significant impact on earnings. On 
the basis of this specification, an increase in electricity provision, a reduction in the student-
teacher ratio and an increase in the table-student ratio by one standard deviation may be ex-
pected to increase earnings by 5.6 percent, 3.3 percent and 4.5 percent respectively. Overall, 
this specification appears to lead to slightly larger effects of school quality on earnings. 
It is somewhat difficult to compare the relative merits of the two specifications. 
Equation ( 4), estimates in column 4, is theoretically closer to the Mincer model. However, it 
may be incorrect to assume that school quality does not exert a direct effect on earnings. To 
compare the two specifications on statistical grounds, J-tests for non-nested hypotheses were 
conducted. These tests were inconclusive. The specification in column 4 was rejected in favor 
of column 5 (p-value 0.020) and in tum, the column 5 specification was rejected in favor of 
column 4 (p-value 0.054). The inconclusive results suggest that the data are not rich enough 
to discriminate between the two specifications. 
An alternative is to allow school quality to exert a direct effect on earnings and an ef-
fect through the rate of return to education. Estimates based on such a specification are pre-
sented in column 6. Jointly, the four school quality variables and their interactions are statis-
tically significant (p-value 0.0001 ). As the bottom panel of table 2 displays, this hybrid speci-
fication suggests that returns to education are influenced by school quality. The effect on the 
level of earnings is also positive and quite similar to those repo11ed on the basis of equation 
(7), column 5 estimates. As noted earlier, if the impact of school quality on educational re-
turns is small then the estimates based on equation (7), column 5 and equation (8), column 6 
should not differ appreciably. This appears to be the case in our estimates. 
Since this hybrid specification nests the specifications reported in columns 4 and 5, F-
tests may be used to discriminate between the three specifications. An F-test between col-
umn 4 and column 6 leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the 
four school quality variables are zero (p-value 0.0511 ). On the other hand a test between col-
umns 5 and 6 does not lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis that the interacted school 
quality variables are zero (p-value 0.1273). While this does seem to provide some support 
for the direct school quality-earnings specification, it is clearly not very convincing. Given 
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that we are unable to convincingly discriminate between the specifications, and that the 
school quality effects on the basis of column 5 and 6 estimates are very similar, we decided to 
continue our examination of the school quality-earnings relationship on the basis of both, 
column 4 and column 5 estimates. A related justification for persisting with both specifca-
tions is that the former is more closely integrated with the Mincer model, while the latter is 
the most widely used specification and this may enhance the comparability of our results. 
Overall, we note that regardless of the specification used, there appears to be a statis-
tically and quantitatively significant impact of school quality on earnings. These estimates 
suggest that males educated in municipalities with better school quality do tend to b~ re-
warded with higher earnings. Depending on the specification, the effect of an increase in 
electricity provision by one standard deviation increases earnings by 3-5.6 percent, a similar 
increase in the student-table ratio increases earnings by 3.3-4.3 percent, while a decrease in 
the student teacher-ratio may be expected to increase earnings by around 2.7 to 4.5 percent. 
The school quality effects obtained here appear to be much larger as compared to those re-
p011ed for the United States. Betts (1996a) reports that, on average, studies that have used 
district level data to examine this issue find earnings elasticity with respect to the teacher-
student ratio of 0.024. Based on the estimates reported here the elasticity of earnings with re-
spect to the teacher-student ratio ranges from 0.171 to 0.232. This should not be particularly 
surprising as the teacher-student ratio in the United States is nearly double that in Honduras. 
For our other measures of school quality the comparable U.S. evidence is limited. 
B. Specification Checks 
In this section we conduct a series of specification checks. We' use the estimates pre-
sented in table 2, columns 4 and 5 as our baseline estimates. These specifications are altered 
in several ways in order to probe the robustness of our results. Tables 3 and 4 summarize our 
analysis. In pruticular, table 3 examines the sensitivity of the school quality earnings link 
based on the specification which allows school quality to influence the rate of return to edu-
cation, while table 4 deals with the specification that allows a direct school quality effect. To 
enable comparisons the first column in tables 3 and 4 reproduce the baseline estimates. 
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Endogeneity of regressors 
The inclusion of school quality variables probably reduces the susceptibility of stan-
dard estimates of educational returns to omitted-variable bias. However, variables that do 
capture school quality can lead to other biases. As outlined in the previous section our school 
quality data suffers from several possible sources of measurement error. A second type of 
problem that might result from including school quality variables is endogeneity bias. If the 
allocation of education resources is systematically related to other factors which detennine 
educational outcomes and these factors are known to school quality providers (the govern-
ment) but unknown to the researcher, estimates of s~hool quality impact may be misleading. 12 
To study the nature of these biases we need instruments for our school quality vari-
ables. These instruments should influence allocation of school quality across municipalities 
but should be legitimate exclusions from the earnings equation. Our data set contains some 
municipal level variables which may serve as legitimate instruments. We instrument each of 
our school quality variables with these municipal level variables. In particular, the school 
quality variables are regressed on municipal level averages of school attainment and infra-
structure indicators such as availability of sewage services and water and municipal level in-
fonnation on occupational distribution in manufacturing and commerce. Typically, these in-
struments (first step regressions) are able to explain 20 to 50 percent of the variation in the 
various school quality indicators. Despite the fairly strong correlation between the school 
quality variables and these instruments, for both specifications (column 1 in tables 3 and 4 ), 
Hausman tests (p-values 0.3600 and 0.4187 respectively) retain the null hypothesis of con-
sistent estimates. As an additional step we COP.ducted simulation exercises assuming different 
levels of classical measurement error in our school quality variables. Allowing for a generous 
measurement error of 25% leads to a substantial understatement of our school quality effects 
(between 33-41 percent). However, the extent of the bias transmitted to the other coefficients 
does not appear to be a severe problem. These results are available on request. 
12 Studies on developed countries (e.g. Heckman et al. 1995) also acknowledge the possibility of cn_dogeniety 
bias. However, the difficulties associated with controlling for such a bias usually leads to the assumption of ex-
ogenous school quality. An exception is Betts ( 1995) who tests for the endogeneity of the school quality vari-
ables and is unable to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. 
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Family Background Characteristics 
Due to data shortcomings the literature largely ignores the possibility that family 
background and school quality may jointly determine earnings. If family background and 
school quality are positively correlated then ignoring such characteristics may lead to mis-
leading inferences about the effect of school quality on earnings. Although we do not have 
information on parental education for all individuals, we can partially control for parental 
education by using measures of average maternal and paternal education in the municipality 
in which the individuals in our sample acquired their education. Estimates including these 
parental schooling variables are presented in column: 2 of tables 3 and 4. As these estimates 
indicate, the inclusion of these parental schooling variables does not substantially alter the 
baseline estimates. The parental schooling variables themselves have a positive although im-
. ff:'. . 13 precise e 1ect on eammgs. 
Additional Teacher Characteristics 
Despite having three variables that may be used to capture the quality of teaching, our 
baseline specifications only use information related to the possession of a teaching degree. In 
addition to this teaching degree, it may be argued that the level of education and the experi-
ence of teachers plays a role in determining educational quality. To allow for these effects, 
estimates including variables that capture teachers' years of schooling and experience are pre-
sented in column 3 of tables 3 and 4. Results in table 3 indicate that the coefficients on both 
these variables are statistically insignificant. The estimated return to education appears to be 
higher than that based on earlier specifications. The coefficients on the school quality vari-
ables register some changes with the schooling-electricity interaction term no longer statisit-
cally significant. For table 4, one of the measures of teacher quality is statistically significant 
(albeit with an unexpected sign). Despite this, it is quite clear that the school quality meas-
13 Using Ghanian data to examine the detenninants oftest scores, Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) fail to find evi-
dence for the sorting of children into better quality schools on the basis of family background. Further, as sug-
gested by Heckman et al. (1995) our use of municipal-level school quality variables probably mitigates these-
lection effects associated with non-random sorting of children into schools. For an opposing view, see Hanushek 
ct al. ( 1995). 
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ures retain their statistical significance and their magnitude is somewhat larger as compared 
to the baseline estimates. 
Other school characteristics 
We have three other measures of school quality that may have been included in our 
specifications. These are the availability of water (WATER), an additional measure of 
crowding-the number of students in a classroom (CLASST), and a measure of the teaching 
technology-the number of multigrade schools in a municipality (MGRADE). Estimates in-
cluding these three measures of school quality are presented in column 4 of tables 3 and 4. 
For both sets of baseline estimates the inclusion of these variables leads to similar effects. Of 
the three measures only MGRADE is statistically significant and surprisingly, it has a posi-
tive effect on earnings (in table 3). This effect is unusual as one may expect a negative asso-
ciation between teaching several grades in the same classroom and earnings. In fact, regres-
sions that include MGRADE but exclude other school quality indicators confirm this expec-
tation. This sign-reversal, associated with the inclusion of other school quality variables 
suggests that multigrade teaching technology per se does not reduce earnings. Rather it is the 
other attributes of multigrade schools, such as their c01Telation with teacher training (-0.61) 
and electrification (-0.77) that appears to be the cause of negative effects associated with at-
tending a multigrade school. The important feature to note from these results is that the esti-
mated educational return appears to be similar to that obtained from earlier specifications. 
The baseline school quality measures retain their statistical significance and their quantitative 
impact is somewhat larger as compared to the baseline estimates. 
So far we have proceeded by considering individual extensions to the baseline speci-
fication. In colunm 5 of tables 3 and 4 we include the family background variables, and the 
additional teacher and school quality characteristics jointly. These estimates reveal a familiar 
pattern. Consistent with our earlier estimates, the baseline school quality variables retain 
their signs and statistical significance. In terms of their magnitude the effects of the school 
quality variables lie in the same range as those obtained from previous specifications. In con-
trast, most of the variables added to our basic specification have insignificant effects. 
On the basis of these various specifications it seems that, regardless of the manner in 
which school quality enters the earnings function there is a discernible and clear school qual-
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ity impact on earnings. Despite the clarity of this finding, the range of estimated school qual-
ity effects suggests that the magnitude of these impacts is difficult to pin down. Consistent 
with a cautious approach, our baseline estimates lie at the lower end of the estimated school 
quality effects. 
C. Quantile Regressions 
Hitherto, we have limited our attention to the effect of schooi quality on the mean of 
the conditional earnings distribution. However, with the use of recently developed tech-
niques it is possible to explore the shape of the conditional distribution. This may be 
achieved by estimating regressions for different quantiles (percentiles) of the conditional dis-
tribution. In addition, quantile regressions are useful in analyzing and detecting heteroskedas-
ticity, and since these regressions are based on minimizing the absolute sum of errors, they 
are more resistant to outliers than OLS estimates (see Deaton, 1997). 
Noting these advantages we tried to re-estimate our baseline specifications using 
quantile regressions. However, possibly due to limited variation in the data, we experienced 
some convergence problems with regressions based on the schooling-school quality inter-
acted specifications (i.e., equation ( 4), in particular, the baseline specification presented in 
table 2, column 4). 14 Thus, this section is based on quantile regression estimates of equation 
(7), that is, our second baseline specification (table 2, column 5). 
These estimates are reported in table 5. 
There are several noteworthy points that emerge from the quantile regressions. Ex-
cept for the magnitude and the imprecision of the electricity provision measure, a compari-
14 To estimate the standard errors of the quantile regression estimates we rely on hundred bootstrap replications. 
A't some percentiles and for some of these replications we experienced convergence problems with the school-
ing-school quality interacted specifications. This is probably due to the much higher correlation among variables 
th~t are used in the interacted specifications as compared to the specifications where school quality influences 
earnings directly. The absolute value of the correlation between school and the four school quality variables 
rahges between 0.06 and 0.15. After interacting these variables the correlation ranges between 0.61 and 0.92. 
The condition number of the matrix of explanatory variables used to estimate equation (4) is around 14, while for 
equation (7) it is around I 0. While it is still possible to obtain estimates since convergence problems arose only 
for some of the replications, we decided to adopt a conservative approach and provide estimates only for equa-
tion (7). · 
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son of the median and mean regressions indicates that the magnitude and the signs on the 
years of schooling and the other school quality variables are quite similar. This indicates that 
outlier observations do not drive our OLS results and once again suggests that individuals 
educated in municipalities with better school quality are rewarded with higher labor market 
earnmgs. 
Turning to the effects at different percentiles, we see that there is a steady increase in 
educational returns from 10.3 percent at the 10th to 13.4 percent at the golh percentile. The 
increasing slope on the schooling coefficient and the consequent widening of the conditional 
earnings distribution as schooling increases, reflects the increasing conditional variance (evi-
dence of heteroscedasticity) of the regression among more highly educated individuals. The 
I 0111 and goth percentiles of the conditional earnings distribution are much further apart among 
highly educated people than those with less education. Thus, those with higher education earn 
more but there is also greater dispersion of earnings among them. In other words within 
group income inequality is much higher among those with higher education as compared to 
those with lower education. 
As far as the school quality variables are concerned, the effects are not as clear cut as 
those for educational returns. Provision of electricity has a large effect at the 10th percentile, 
while at all other percentiles there is no statistically significant impact. The coefficients on 
the student-teacher ratio are insignificant at the 10th and the 25th percentiles, while at the soth 
and 75th they indicate that an increase in the student-teacher ratio is associated with higher 
earnings. At the goth percentile there is no discernible impact of this measure. For our other 
measure of crowding, except for the 75 111 percentile the effect on all the other percentiles 
seems fairly uniform. Although not very clear, the muted school quality effects at the goth 
percentile suggests that as provision of electricity or the student-teacher ratio increases there 
is a decline in the conditional variance of the regression. That is, the various percentiles of the 
conditional earnings distribution are closer among those with higher availability of school 
quality than among those with lower school quality. These results suggest that increases in 
school quality have a stronger effect on lower percentiles of the conditional earnings distribu-
tion. To the extent that higher percentiles of the conditional earnings distribution reflect 
higher ability levels, the results suggest that more able individuals are not affected by school 
quality, while for the less able, the effects of school quality appear to be stronger. However, 
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given the lack of clear patterns on the various school quality coefficients it is rather difficult 
to draw any clear-cut implications from these estimates. 
Overall, these regressions support the pattern of results already established. In addi-
tion, they provide a fuller picture of the somewhat contrasting effects of educational attain-
ment and school quality on earnings. While increasing educational attainment is clearly asso-
ciated with a widening of the conditional earnings distribution, there is some evidence that 
higher school quality may be associated with lower conditional variance. It should be noted 
that, while these regressions provide some more insights they do not tell us anything about 
the causal relationship between school quality and distributional outcomes, nor about the 
factors that may be responsible for the differing effects of educational attainment and school 
quality. While it is tempting to speculate on the underlying reasons for these patterns, we re-
strict ourselves in order to retain focus on the issue at hand (see Mwabu and Schultz, 1996 for 
a potential explanation). 
D. The Impact of School Quality on Earnings and School Attainment 
Tu this point our analysis has concentrated on the effect of school quality on earnings. 
We have examined this role by considering the direct impact of school quality on earnings as 
well as its impact on earnings through its influence on educational returns. An additional 
channel through which school quality may influence earnings is through its impact on educa-
tional attainment. To explore this channel of influence we present some reduced for•n esti-
mates on the link between school quality, educational attairunent and earnings. 
These estimates are presented in table 6. The first column in the table presents re-
duced form estimates of the schooling equation while the second colurrm presents reduced 
fonn estimates of the earnings equation. The reduced form earnings estimates do not control 
for schooling. Therefore, the estimated school quality coefficients capture the effect of 
school quality on education as well as on earnings. 
On the basis of the estimates in column 1, the impact of some of the school quality 
measures on educational attailll11ent appears to be quite different from their impact on e,1rn-
ings. Although statistically significant at around the twelve percent, in contrast to its persis-
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tently negative effect on earnings, teacher qualification (PRO) has a positive impact on 
schooling (an increase of 0.172 years of schooling for a one standard deviation increase in 
this quality measure). The provision of electricity has a considerable impact on school at-
tainment. An increase of one standard deviation increases educational attainment by 0.28 
years. Unlike their strong influence on earnings the crowding measu:res play a relatively mi-
nor role in influencing educational attainment. They are statistically insignificant in the 
schooling regressions, and an increase in these quality measures by one standard deviation 
increases schooling by around 0.048 to 0.090 years. What explains the different effects of 
our school quality variables on earnings and educat~onal attainment? A plausible explanation 
might lie in the nature of these variables. Teacher training (PRO) and provision of electricity 
may be capturing the availability of schooling rather than the quality of instruction received 
by a student. The presence of a school in an area can be expected to increase educational at-
tainment and hence the stronger effect of these two variables on educational attainment. 
However, the quality of the instruction received in this school might be reflected through 
measures of school crowding and consequently the greater influence of these variables on 
eammgs. 
Turning to the reduced form earnings equation we see that, although the magnitude of 
the variables is considerably larger, their qualitative impact is similar to those reported earlier. 
These reduced fonn estimates may be used to evaluate the total impact (the effect on educa-
tional attainment and earnings) of school quality on earnings versus their impact on earnings 
through educational attainment. On the basis of the estimates in columns 1 and 2, an increase 
in instructor qualifications (one standard deviation) decre3ses earnings by -1.9 percent (albeit 
insignificant) and increases educational attainment by 0.172 years. The return to schooling 
(when it is added to the earnings specification) is 11. 7 percent. Thus, a 0.172 year increase in 
educational attainment may be expected to raise earnings by 2.01 (0.172 x 11. 7) percent. 
Although the teacher quality measure seems to be associated with higher educational attain-
ment, it does not appear to be translated into higher earnings. 
Except for the teacher quality measure, comparisons of the school quality-earnings ef-
fects based on the reduced fom1 earnings equations versus their impact through an increase in 
educational attainment, reveals a similar story. For instance a decrease in the student-teacher 
ratio by one standard deviation increases earnings by 7.4 percent and increases schooling by 
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0.090 years. This increase in educational attainment may be expected to raise earnings by 
about a percent (11.7 x 0.090). Thus the overall increase in earnings due to a reduction in the 
student-teacher ratio is considerably larger than that expected on the basis of an increase in 
years of schooling. A similar underestimate is found for our other measure of crowding and 
for school electrification. For the table-student ratio the effects are 6.3 percent on the basis of 
the reduced from earnings results and less than a percent on the basis of an increase in years 
of schooling, while for school electrification the effects are 21.5 percent and 3.3 percent re-
spectively. 
We draw a couple of conclusions from these results. One, although the relative im-
portance of the different school quality measures for earnings and educational outcomes ap-
pear to be different, it seems that school quality has a positive impact on educational attain-
ment and on earnings. Second, focusing only on the effect of school quality on earnings 
tlu-ough education tends to lead to an underestimate of the economic effects of school quality. 
The increases in earnings reported in this section reflect the "total" impact of school quality 
on earnings. That is, the direct effect of school quality on earnings as well as the effect of 
school quality through its influence on educational attainment and its influence on educa-
tional returns. Combining the results presented here with the previously assembled evidence 
provides substantial support for the claim that increases in school quality lead to higher earn-
mgs. 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Educational expenditures account for over one-sixth of public sector expenditures in 
the developing world. Recently the emphasis has shifted from expanding access and in-
creasing attainment to improving the quality of education. Yet, surprisingly little is known 
about the returns to investments in school quality. 
In repose to this shortcoming, this paper used data from Honduras to examine the 
economic effects of school quality. Before summarizing the results, we must point out that 
while the data used in this paper may have been some of the best developing country data to 
address this issue it was subject to several drawbacks. First, our measures of school quality 
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were municipal level-averages and despite controls for inter-municipality variation it is pos-
sible that some of these measures (e.g., electricity) reflected overall levels of infrastructure in 
a municipality and exaggerated the effects of school quality. Second, our data on school 
quality and earnings were contemporaneous and may have been subject to measurement er-
ror. We took several precautions to minimize errors and conducted several tests to examine 
the effects of these data shortcomings on our results. Notwithstanding these efforts, it is clear 
that the results should be interpreted keeping in mind the data constraints. 
Turning to the results, our examination of the economic effects of school quality 
found that men educated in counties with better quality schooling earned significantly higher 
incomes than those men educated in counties with low-quality schools. Our findings were 
robust to a variety of specifications. In almost all our specifications the impact of three out of 
four of our school quality measures was statistically significant at at least the ten percent 
level. While the qualitative findings were clear, the magnitude of the school quality impact 
was harder to pin down. Also, the relative importance of the school quality measures for 
earnings and educational outcomes appeared to be quite different. While measures of 
crowding seemed to be particularly important for detern1ining earnings outcomes, teacher 
quality and access to public services (provision of electricity) had a greater influence on edu-
cational attainment. Despite these inconsistencies, the overall flavor that emerged from our 
results was that the quality of schooling has a positive effect on labor market earnings. 
The positive impact on earnings reported in this paper appears to be in marked con-
trast with the substantial body of literature that has used test scores as a measures of school 
quality effectiveness. The underlying reasons for this are not very clear. Perhaps the scrutiny 
of labor markets is simpler and more uniform than test instruments devised by researchers 
and educators. 
As compared to the developed country literature on the school-quality earnings link, 
our paper falls in the category of papers that uses district level data, data on younger workers 
and from those educated in the 1960s. As pointed out in section II, studies with these char-
acteristics and usually based on data from the United States, have often found insignificant 
school quality effects. Despite these similarities, the differences between the level of educa-
tional quality for the United States and Honduras suggests that such comparisons may not be 
very useful. The difficulties entailed in obtaining the appropriate data have limited the num-
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her of developing country studies that have examined the school quality-earnings link. The 
results reported in this paper are consistent with these few other pieces that have relied on 
data from developing countries. These papers and our work support the idea that school 
quality should be an important aspect of educational policy because labor markets recognize 
it as a productive investment and reward it with higher wages. 
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VJ 
IV 
Variable 
Individual level variables 
TOTALINC 
SCHOOL 
EXP ER 
MARRIED 
MIGRANT 
EAST 
WEST 
NORTH 
SOUTH 
CENTRAL 
Municipal level variables 
PRO 
T SCHOOL 
T EXPER 
ELECTRICITY 
WATER 
MG RADE 
STTEACH 
CLASSST 
TABLEST 
SCHFATH 
SCH MOTH 
Observations 
Table 1 
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Label Mean Std. Dev. 
Monthly income in Lempiras 41 1.760 471.930 
Years of schooling 7.165 4.352 
Experience 11.440 6.436 
Married= I 0.288 0.453 
Migrant= I 0.512 0.500 
Resides in the East = I 0.078 0.268 
Resides in the West= l 0 .089 0.284 
Resides in the North = 1 0.370 0.482 
Resic.ies in the South = l 0.104 0.305 
Resides in the Central area = 1 0.359 0.480 
Percentage of teachers with professional degrees 0.691 0.169 
Years of schooling - teacher 13.890 0.379 
Years of experience - teacher 13.300 2.168 
Percentage of schools with electrici ty 0.315 0.250 
Percentage of schools with water 0.509 0. 198 
Percentage of multigrade schools 0.405 0.191 
Student/teacher ratio 41.090 7.756 
Class/student ratio 0.030 0.010 
Table/student ratio 0.068 0.041 
Years of schooling - father 2.730 1.806 
Years of schooling - mother 2.908 0.618 
3691 
w 
w 
.L 
CONSTANT 
Years of Schooling (SCHOOL) 
Percentage of teachers with professional 
degrees 
Percentage of schools with electricity 
Student/teacher ratio* I 0 
Class/student ratio 
SCHOOL *Percentage of teachers with 
professional degrees 
SCHOOL *Percentage of schools with 
electricity 
SCHOOL *Student/teacher-ratio* I 0 
SCHOOL *Table/student-ratio 
R! 
Returns to education at Q 
Returns to education at Q +o-y 
Returns to school quality at S and Q 
(8Y/Y) o Percentage of teachers with 
professional degrees 
(8Y /Y) o Percentage of schools with 
electricity 
(DY /Y) o Student/teacher-ratio* I 0 
. (DY /Y) o Table/student-ratio 
Table 2 
Impact of School Quality on Earnings 
{ I ) (2) (3) 
3.962 3.993 3.746 
(0.052) (0.088) (0.144) 
0. 138 0. 122 0.147 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.0 13) 
-0.013 
(0.0 13) 
0.017 
(0.009) 
-0.008 
(0.002) 
0.091 
(0.039) 
0.362 0.387 0.394 
0. 117 
(0.004) 
0. 129 
(0.004) 
-0.097 
(0.096) 
0.124 
(0.068) 
-0.055 
(0.020) 
0.65 1 
(0.28 1) 
(4) (5) (6) 
3.746 3.792 3.456 
(0. 150) (0.21 4) (0.301) 
0.147 0.117 0.168 
(0.017) (0.005) (0.032) 
-0.114 -0.017 
(0.11 5) (0.220) 
0.223 0.109 
(0.110) (0.135) 
-0.042 0.003 
(0.023) (0.004) 
1.086 1.485 
(0.301) (0.525) 
-0.0 13 -0.011 
(0.0 15) (0.028) 
0.017 0.012 
(0.010) (0.0 13) 
-0.008 -0.010 
(0.003) (0.005) 
0.091 -0.058 
(0.039) (0.072) 
0.394 0.394 0.396 
0.117 0.117 0.117 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
0.129 0. 11 7 0.124 
(0 .004) (0.005) (0.005) 
-0.097 -0.114 -0.099 
(0. 106) (0. 115) (0.11 4) 
0.124 0.223 0.194 
(0.070) (0.110) (0.107) 
-0.055 -0.042 -0.044 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.020) 
0.651 1.086 1.073 
(0.279) (0.301) (0.301) 
Notes: Sample size - 369 1. Estimates in columns 2-6 include controls for experience, marriage, migratory status, region of residence and a selection correction 
term for migrant endogeneity. In addition, estimates in columns 3-6 include five variables that contro l for inter-municipal variat ion in wealth. Standard errors in 
columns 4-6 are corrected for heteroscedasticity and for intra-municipal error correlation. Returns to education and school quality are computed at the means of 
the schooling ( S) and school quality ( Q) variables. 
w 
~ 
Table 3 
Impact of School Quality on Earnings - Specification Checks 
(Std. Errors) 
( I ) (2) (3) 
Years of schooling (SCHOOL) 0.147 0. 147 0.173 
(0.017) (0.0 16) (0.066) 
SCHOOL *Percentage of teachers with -0.013 -0.015 -0.014 
professional degrees (0.015) (0.014) (0.0 14) 
SCHOOL *Percentage of schools with 0.017 0.0 18 0.015 
electricity (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
SCHOOL *Student/teacher ratio* I 0 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SCHOOL *Student/table ratio 0.091 0.084 0.096 
(0.039) (0.038) (0.040) 
Years of schooling-father 0.0 10 
(0.007) 
Years of schooling-mother 0.0 11 
(0.0 19) 
SCHOOL *Years of schooling-teacher -0.002 
(0.004) 
SCHOOL *Years of experience-teacher 0.001 
(0.00 1) 
SCHOOL *Percentage of schools with 
water 
SCHOOL *Percentage of multigrade 
schools -
SCHOOL *Class/student ratio 
R· 0.394 0.395 0.394 
Returns to education at Q 0.117 0.1 17 0.117 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Returns to education at Q +cr0 0.129 0. 129 0.129 
Returns to school quality at S and Q (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
(8Y/Y) a Percentage of teachers with 
-0.097 -0.106 -0. 102 
professional degrees (0.106) (0.103) (0. 103) (DY /Y) a Percentage of schools with 0.124 0.128 0. 111 
electricity (0.070) (0.068) (0.070) 
(8Y/Y) a Student/teacher ratio 
-0.055 -0.054 -0.058 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
(DY/Y) D Table/student ratio 0.651 0.604 0.689 
(0.279) (0.274) (0.287) 
(4) (5) 
0.138 0.174 
(0.0 15) (0.065) 
-0.012 -0.014 
(0.014) (0.014) 
0.035 0.033 
(0.015) (0.014) 
-0.010 -0.010 
(0.003) (0.003) 
0.139 0.128 
(0.049) (0.049) 
0.0 11 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.0 19) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.009 0.009 
(0.014) (0.014) 
0.040 0.039 
(0.0 16) (0.016) 
-0.389 -0.346 
(0.269) (0.273) 
0.395 0.396 
0.118 0.11 8 
(0.004) (0.004) 
0.144 0.142 
(0.007) (0.007) 
-0.085 -0.097 
(0.098) (0.098) 
0.250 0.238 
(0.107) (0.1 03) 
-0.073 -0.072 
(0.020) (0.020) 
0.994 0.915 
(0.352) (0.354) 
Notes: Sample size - 3691. The functional form of the regression speci ti cation is based on equation (4). All estimates include controls for experience, 
marriage, migrntory status, region of residence, a selection correction term for migrant endogeneity and five variables that control for inter-municipal 
variation in wealth. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and for intra-municipal error correlation. Returns to education and school 
quality are computed at the means of the schooling ( S) and school qual ity ( Q) variables. 
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Table 4 
Impact of School Quality on Earnings - Specification Checks 
(1) (2) (3) 
Years of schooling 0.117 0.117 0.115 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Percentage of teachers with -0.114 -0.126 -0.138 
professional degrees (0.115) (0.111) (0.113) 
Percentage of schools with electricity 0.223 0.225 0.323 
(0.110) (0.106) (0.125) 
Student/teacher ratio *I 0 -0 .042 -0.041 -0.057 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.020) 
Table/student ratio 1.086 1.022 1.243 
(0.301) (0.286) (0.352) 
Years of schooling-father 0.010 
(0.006) 
Years of schooling-mother 0.009 
(0.018) 
Years of schooling-teacher -0.064 
(0.03 1) 
Years of experience-teacher 0.018 
(0.012) 
Percentage of schools with water 
Percentage of multi grade schools 
Class/student ratio -
. 
R- 0.394 0.394 0.395 
(4) (5) 
0.118 0.114 
(0.005) (0.006) 
-0.108 -0. 135 
(0.116) (0.112) 
0.298 0.322 
(0.135) (0.135) 
-0.047 -0.049 
(0.020) (0.020) 
1.233 1.1 06 
(0.396) (0.387) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.019) 
-0.063 
(0.032) 
0.019 
(0.022) 
0.017 0.016 
(0.109) (0 .118) 
0.225 -0.01 1 
(0.140) (0 .238) 
-1.366 1.610 
(2.159) (3.08 1) 
0.394 0.396 
Notes: Sample size - 369 I. The functional form of the re~ression spcci fication is based on equation (7). Estimates include controls for marriage, migratory status, 
region of residence, a selection correction term for migrant endogcncity, and five variables that control for inter-municipal variation in wealth. Standard errors 
are corrected for heteroscedasticity and for intra-municipal error correlation. · 
w 
0\ 
Years of Schooling 
Percentage of teachers 
with professional degrees 
Table S 
School Quality and Earnings - Quantile Regressions 
(Std. Errors) 
JO 25 50 75 
0.103 0.111 0.121 0.124 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
-0.181 -0.25 1 -0. 129 -0.045 
(0.159) (0.095) (0 .084) (0.104) 
Percentage of schools with 0.224 0.093 0.094 0.086 
electricity (0.096) (0.081) (0.060) (0.090) 
.. 
Student/teacher ratio* I 0 -0.005 -0.035 -0.035 -0.048 
(0.039) (0.024) (0.0 15) (0.020) 
Student/table ratio 1.3 11 0.991 0.997 0.394 
(0.688) (0.357) (0.221) (0.278) 
Psuedo R1 0.181 0.233 0.287 0.324 
90 
0.134 
(0.005) 
0.114 
(0 .749) 
0.096 
(0. 125) 
0.004 
(0.032) 
0.862 
(0.417) 
0.340 
Notes: Sample size - 3691. The functional form o f the regression specification is based on equation (7). Estimates include 
controls for experience, marriage, migratory status, region of residence, and five variables that control for inter-municipal 
variation in wealth. Standard errors are estimated using hundred bootstrap replications. 
w 
-.J 
Table 6 
Impact of School Quality on Education and Earnings 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Schooling Reduced Effect on Effect on Effect on 
fo rm years of earnings via earnings 
earnings schooling impact on based on 
(LIQ - one schoo ling column 2 
std. dev.) (%) estimates(%) 
Percentage of teachers with 1.0 18 -0.11 0 0.1 72 2 .0 1 -1.86 
professional degrees (0.649) (0.1 62) (0 .110) (2.74) 
Percentage of schools with 1.116 0.858 0.280 3.28 2 1.5 
electricity (0.439) (0.187) (0.110) (4.70) 
-Student/teacher ratio -0.011 -0.094 0.090 1.05 7.36 
(0.013) (0.003) (0.099) (2.52) 
Table/student ratio 1.174 1.526 0.048 0.56 6.27 
( 1.807) (0.518) (0.074) (2. 13) 
RL 0.150 0.209 
Notes: Sample size - 3691. The school ing regression includes controls for marriage, migratory status, region of 
residence, and five variables that control for inter-municipal variations in wealth. Reduced fo rm earnings estimates 
include controls for experience, marriage, migratory status, region of residence, a selection correction term for 
migrant endogeneity, and five variables that control for inter-mun icipal variation in wea lth. Standard errors are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and for intra-municipa l error correlat ion. 
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Figure 1: School and Teacher Density in Honduras 
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Sources: Several issues of the Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, United Nations, Santiago, Chile. Economic and Social Progress in Latin 
America, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington D.C., and the UNESCO Year Book of Education, Paris. 
